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right and concommitant responsibility of corporal punishment. Differing
statutory schemes augmented by local regulation dot our legal landscape.
With state law seemingly entrenched in the traditional views, opponents of
corporal punishment are turning to the federal courts and the Constitution
for help. So far, they have found little solace there. However, with the
recent cases on prisoners' rights, application of due process principles
to the schools, and a growing anti-corporal punishment sentiment the
day may not be far off when reason rather than fear will reign in
the nation's schools, and the last vestiges of corporal punishment in
America will be gone.
WILLIAM IRWIN ARBUCKLE, III
* Reforming the Mental Health Law of Ohio
INTRODUCTION
IT WAS A COLD, SNOWY DAY toward the end of November, 1859. C. P.
Wolcott, one of Akron's prominent attorneys, bundled up on the seat
of his "buckboard," was driving his team all about town, trying to obtain
affidavits from various citizens of his community who could testify to his
client's mad delusions, and thereby save him from execution for charges
arising from his attempt to seize the federal army arsenal at Harper's
Ferry, Virginia, the previous October 16th. 1 John Brown, married and the
father of 20 children, was sentenced to be hanged on December 2nd.
2
The client sincerely believed that he was given instructions directly by his
Creator to take the arsenal and thereby to touch off and to lead the war to
free the slaves. His success was to be certain and was divinely promised;
and moreover, divine direction as to the employment of the proper means
to wage this great struggle were assured. He had a strong strain of madness
in his family, possibly descending genetically from his mother.
Governor Wise remained unmoved, and the client and his attorney
lost their race against time. John Brown was hanged, only 47 short days
after his balloon of fantasy had burst.
His soul goes marching on, though, in perhaps more ways than one.
In July, 1972, a stone's throw from where John Brown's home still stands
in Akron, Ohio, J. A. Ciocia, a legal aid lawyer at the Hawthornden State
Hospital, appeared before Judge Evan Reed, in the Common Pleas Court
of Summit County, to argue on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus for
the release of the "Hawthornden -7"; a group of hospitalized mental
patients on whose behalf he claimed denial of counsel for their commit-
ment proceedings, failure to conduct regular, periodic evaluations of their
12 H. Howe, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS OF OHIO 650 (1907).
22 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 534, 5 (1960 ed.).
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conditions during the long years of their commitments, and continued
confinement even though they were now well enough to be released. Again
in 1972, as 113 unlucky years earlier, counsel for the "insane" lost his
case.3 In the summer of 1973, he prevailed in his appeal to the next higher
court.4 The matter still remains, for the Ohio Supreme Court to decide.
For almost a century and three-quarters, lawyers, legislators, judges,
and jurists in Ohio have been grappling with the challenge presented to
them by the problems of dealing with the mentally ill. This challenge,
however, is not one solely to be met by those involved in the legal
system. In order to effectively deal with the legal problems of the mentally
ill the public at large must understand those problems and support the
efforts of the legislators, lawyers, judges and attorneys who deal with
mentally ill persons. In order to do so, members of the public must meet
the challenge presented to them by overcoming the fears and animosity
toward the mentally ill which are too often present in the minds of many
persons-as is illustrated by the political leaflet shown in figure 1.
THE POLICE DEPARTMENT
CALLS THEM
"WALKERS"
The "walkers" are mental patients sent to Long Beach from
Pilgrim State Hospital with the blessings of the Caso administra-
tion and the local Republican Party.
On December 30, 1971 there were 108 mental patients in
Long Beach. On October 15, 1973 there were 502 patients living
in our city-AN INCREASE OF 400%. The Republican adminis-
tration has sat by allowing this new menace in our midst.
The Democratic City Council Team will stop the shipping of
mental patients to Long Beach with court action and strict
enforcement.
ON ELECTION DAY-NOV. 6
VOTE DEMOCRATIC-ROW B
Paid for by the Long Beach, New York, Democratic Citizens Campaign Committee
Fio. 1
Article VII, section 1, of the Constitution of Ohio provides,
3 In re Fisher, Civil No. 72-61324 (Ct. Comm. PL, Summit County, Ohio, July 7, 1972).
4 ln re Fisher, No. CA-7077 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist., Sept. 19, 1973).
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"Institutions for the benefit of the insane... shall always be fostered and
supported by the state; and be subject to such regulations as may be
prescribed by the General Assembly." 5 The courts of Ohio have repeatedly
interpreted this provision over the years to require proper and adequate
care for the mentally ill. In 1901, in the case of In re Emswiler, the court
said, "It is the humane policy of the state to take care and provide for
persons who are so unfortunate as to be afflicted with such mental infirmity
which renders them unable to take care of and protect themselves in
person and property." The opinion in Rice v. State, in 1918, states,
The constitution-makers of our state acted wisely and humanely
when they provided for the fostering and support of institutions for
the insane .... and the legislature of Ohio exemplified its humani-
tarian spirit when it passed the law now before us for consideration,
and thereby provided for the maintenance, support, and care of such
unfortunate wards.7
Reiterating, in 1926, State ex rel Goebel v. Brown said, "The consti-
tution of Ohio places upon the state the obligation to care and provide for
its insane wards." Also, in 1935, in Gollwitzer v. Gorman, the courts said,
"There can be no question that under the provisions of this Article of the
constitution that it is the duty of the state to care for the persons under
consideration.. ."9 Most recently, in 1946, Hickey v. Burke said,
The people, through the state constitution, have conferred upon the
General Assembly the legislative power of the state which embraces
inter alia, the power to legislate for the public health, and that
therefore it has the power to make provision by legislation for the
mentally iU.10
The courts had recognized these legislative powers in 1881, saying,
in State v. Kieswetter, "The provision of the Constitution is not
self-executing, and that the mode in which institutions mentioned
therein are to be fostered and supported is left to the discretion of
the general assembly."''
In 1905, in Doren v. Fleming, it was said,
The court will not assume the authority to prescribe rules for the
governing of the state charitable and benevolent institutions; their
authority to interfere arises only where it is shown that the rules
are unreasonable and subversive of the purposes for which such
institutions are established and maintained.1 2
5 Omo CoNsT. art. VII, § 1 (1851).
6In re Emswiler, 8 Ohio N.P. 132, 133, 11, 13 Ohio Dec. 10 (P. Ct. 1901).
7 Rice v. State, 14 Ohio App. 9, 13 (1918).
8 State ex rel Goebel v. Brown, 4 Ohio L. Abs. 333 (Ct. App. 1926).
9 Gollwitzer v. German, 19 Ohio L. Abs. 454, 456 (C.P., Cuyahoga County, 1935).
20 Hickey v. Burke, 78 Ohio App. 351, 355, 69 N.E.2d 33, 36 (1946).
11 State v. Kiesewetter, 37 Ohio St. 546, 9 (1882).
12 Doren v. Fleming, 6 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 81, 85, 27 Ohio C.C.R. 737, 741 (1905).
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It appears that the courts recognize the pre-eminence of thelegislature in the administration of programs for the mentally ill, but that
they still appear to reserve for themselves the power to review them. This
"Doren Doctrine" could become applicable whenever a party aggrieved
in a particular instance receives no relief from the state hospital system,
and seeks his remedy before the bench.
WHAT Is MENTAL ILLNESS? CRIMINAL INSANITY?
In Ohio, the legislature has created the Department of Mental Health
and Retardation for the purpose of caring for the mentally ill. "Mentally
ill" is defined by section 5122.01 (A), of the OHIO REVISED CODE:
Mentally ill individual means an individual having an illness which
substantially impairs the capacity of the person to use self-control,judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social
relations, and includes lunacy, unsoundness of mind, insanity, and
also cases in which such lessening of capacity for control is causedby such addiction to alcohol, or by such use of a drug of abuse thatthe individual is or is in danger of becoming a drug dependentperson, so as to make it necessary for such person to be under
treatment, care, supervision, guidance, or control.U
Chapter 5122 of the Code was drafted to make provision for the
aforementioned "necessity," by placing upon the Probate Courts the duties
of determining whether persons fall into that category, and of ordering
them to be placed under the jurisdiction of the state system when
appropriate. Paragraph (B) of the aforementioned section 5122.01 lays
out the criteria by which the Probate Courts may reach such a finding:
"Mentally ill individual subject to hospitalization of court order"
means a mentally ill individual who, because of his illness, is likely
to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty, or is in
need of care or treatment in a mental hospital, and because of hisillness lacks sufficient insight or capacity to make responsible
decisions with respect to his hospitalization.14
Mentally ill offenders prosecuted for crimes in the Common PleasCourts are still generally judged in accordance with strict criteria which
were first laid down during the trial of an assassin in England over a
century and a quarter ago:
In London, in 1843, a man waited outside the home of Sir RobertPeel. He waited until he saw the door to Sir Robert's house being
opened, and then he moved quickly. Seconds later a man lay dying
on the sidewalk, shot down by a killer whose mind was obsessed withdelusions of persecution. The killer's name was Daniel M'Naghten;
the victim was Edward Drummond, private secretary to Sir Robert,
who had been mistaken by the killer for the latter. At the trial ofM'Naghten for murder, the defense was insanity. Substantial medical
13 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01-A (Page 1972).
14 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01-B (Page 1972),
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evidence was introduced showing that the defendant was driven by
morbid delusions of persecution beyond the power of self-control.
Such delusions, it was argued, left him with no perception of right
and wrong, and rendered him incapable of controlling his acts
connected with such delusions. He was found not guilty, "on the
ground of insanity."' 5
The English court said:
[J]urors ought to be told in all cases that every man is to be presumed
to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be respon-
sible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction;
and that to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party
accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of
the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what
was wrong. The mode of putting the latter part of the question to the
jury.., has generally been, whether the accused at the time of doing
the act knew the difference between right and wrong... in respect
to the very act with which he is charged .... 16
And in that same year, 1843, the Ohio Supreme Court, in Clark
v. State of Ohio,17 adopted what is now known as the "M'Naghten Rule"
as Ohio's criterion for determination of insanity in criminal cases. This
rule, however, received a scathing criticism in 1966 by the Common Pleas
Court of Cuyahoga County, in State v. Colby, in the trial resulting from
the unusually grisly crime whereby a housewife shot her neighbor's
eight-year-old little boy in the back of his head with a revolver, after
luring him into her home for a birthday party:
The court is well aware that at the present time the legal test of
insanity in Ohio is a test of responsibility rather than a medical test
as to insanity ... The court is convinced, however, that, having
carefully examined into all facets of the right and wrong test, it has a
duty to speak out on the subject of Ohio's legal test for insanity in
criminal cases. Unless and until some trial court under proper
circumstances has the courage to point the way to a better method of
submitting to the triers of the facts the issue of the insanity of the
accused when insanity is tendered as a defense, then Ohio will
continue to adhere to criteria which more and more are challenged as
being false. The court has reached the conclusion that the present
right and wrong test, the M'Naghten rules, for deciding criminal
responsibility is "based on an entirely obsolete and misleading
conception of the nature of insanity, since insanity does not only, or
primarily, affect the cognitive or intellectual faculties, but affects the
whole personality of the patient, including both the will and the emo-
tions. An insane person may, therefore, know the nature and quality
8 AM. JuR. Proof of Facts 4-5, Intro. § I-(A) (1960).
16 McNaughton's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722-23 (1843).
17 Clark v. State, 12 Ohio 483 (1843).
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of his act and that it is wrong and forbidden by law, and yet commitit as a result of the mental disease." (Report of the Royal Commission
on Capital Punishment, 1949-53, Cmd. No. 8932 at Pg. 80.)18
In 1969, in the decision in the case of State v. Staten, the OhioSupreme Court, retrospectively reviewing prior decisions involving the
application of the M'Naghten Rule in Ohio, concluded that courts in
the past had apparently broadened it somewhat:
[A] person should not be punished for what he does, if, by reason
of mental disease, he either does not know that what he did was
wrong or could not prevent himself from doing it; and that punishing
such an irresponsible individual will deter neither him nor others
from doing what he did.19
Now a new dimension appears: even if the defendant did know right from
wrong, he could still be found not guilty by reason of insanity if he could
not restrain himself from committing his offense. But the court did not go
so far as to say that it would favor the acquittal on grounds of insanity of
a person whose capacity to judge right from wrong or to refrain fromdoing wrong was diminished by the fact that he was mentally ill. So herethe line was drawn-the decision would still be between black and white,i.e., possession of capacity or lack of capacity. There would be no
allowance for that grey area where many, if not most, criminals wouldfall. Thus, in the area where the greatest discretion would be required, no
discretion would be allowed.
In December, 1972, the Ohio legislature passed a new criminal
code,20 incorporating, among other provisions, one dealing with certain
mentally ill offenders. Although it appears to leave the Staten application
of the M'Naghten Rule untouched, it does tend to apply the theory ofdiminished capacity in the case of a capital offense, in section 2901.94(B):
When death may be imposed as a penalty for murder in the firstdegree, the court shall require a pre-sentence investigation and apsychiatric examination to be made and reports submitted to the
court, pursuant to section 2947.06 of the Revised Code. Copies ofthe reports shall be furnished to the prosecutor and to the offender
or his counsel. The court shall hear testimony and other evidence,the statement, if any, of the offender, and the arguments, if any, by
counsel for the defense and prosecution, relevant to the penalty
which should be imposed on the offender.2 '
The court may find that the mitigating circumstance of insanity existsin accordance with section 2901.95(B) (3), if: "[t]he offense was primarily
a product of the offender's psychosis or mental deficiency, though such
18 State v. Colby, 35 Ohio Op. 2d 61, 62-3, 215 N.E.2d 65, 66 (1966).
19 State v. Staten, 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 19-20, 247 N.E.2d 293, 298 (1969).2 0 Amended Substitute H.B. 511, 109th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1971-1972).
21 Id., enacting OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.94(B) (Page 1972).
AKRON LAW IEVMW [Vol. 7:3
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condition is insufficient to establish the defense of insanity."22
If this degree of mitigating insanity is found, the offender will be
sentenced to life imprisonment instead of death. This recognition of a
condition of mental illness which is not serious enough to destroy the
offender's capacity to judge right from wrong, but which will result
in the production of his criminal act is most certainly a step in the
right direction.
A test was applied by the Municipal Court of Franklin County in
a case involving a violation of a Columbus lewdness ordinance; a
trans-sexual male was arrested for wearing clothes appropriate to the
female sex. The court, posing a more enlightened criterion of insanity
defense than the previous Staten ruling, acknowledged trans-sexuality to
be a form of mental disorder and said,
An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act is the
product of a mental disease or defect. Criminal responsibility
attaches to those who, of their own free will and with evil intent,
commit acts which violate the law. On the facts of this case, we
cannot hold the defendant criminally liable and therefore the charges
brought against him are dismissed. 23
It would seem that an enactment of this test into the law as an
insanity defense or its adoption by the Ohio Supreme Court would
be needed to assure that it would be applied to all cases where it could be
appropriately used to safeguard the rights of the criminally insane. This
still leaves open the question of how the courts are to go about
determining, in civil commitment by Probate hearing, or in criminal
proceedings at a Common Pleas trial, whether the person before the
bench is actually mentally ill, and whether he can take care of himself in
society and refrain from harming himself or others, or whether he should
be under supervision by the state. Unless the courts make their decisions
as to these factors based on advice from experts in the field of mental
health who are equipped to apply the latest technology to their craft, the
person suspected of being mentally ill may receive less than that due
process of law to which he is entitled. Such technology must necessarily
include the ability, through scientific testing, to present substantial,
concrete evidence to the court of the allegedly mentally ill person's
particular disabilities.
Psychiatric examination alone, a totally empirical, variegated process,
may not always be conclusive. In the words of Judge Tom R. Blaine,
[a] psychiatrist.. . called as a witness in court, frequently where ajury has to decide the issue involved, will testify that he does not
recognize the words "sane" or "insane"; that these are legal, not
medical words. The witness will then go into a psychoanalytical
22 Id., enacting OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.95(B) (3) (Page 1972).
23 Columbus v. Zanders, 25 Ohio Misc. 144, 150, 266 N.E2d 602, 606 (1970).
COMMENTS
7
Feldman: Reforming the Mental Health Law of Ohio
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1974
AxRON LAw REviEw
lecture that soars completely over the heads of the judge and jurors;
all they will remember of the doctor's testimony will be something
about a person being able or not able to adjust to his environment.
The truth of the matter is that the standards of conduct prescribed
by law for persons in both civil and criminal cases are not recognized
by the Freudians; consequently, their conclusions and deductions are
of no value to judges and jurors in court.24
In addition to rapid advancements in the field of biochemical or
orthomolecular psychiatry, new developments in the field of psychological
testing, which have been advancing as rapidly as those in the biochemical
realm, present far more scientific methods of determining the manifesta-
tions of mental illness than have been available to the courts until this
time. One of these tests, the Hoffer-Osmond Diagnostic Test, is a simple,
true-or-false vehicle which can be filled out in counsel's offices or judge's
chambers by the individual who is believed to -be mentally ill in less than
20 minutes, which can be scored in a few more minutes, and which can
reveal clearly to any layman the extent to which that individual is
experiencing mental problems. Where more time is available, and where
more sophisticated accuracy is desired, a psychologist can administer such
testing as the Experiential World Inventory (E.W.I.), which was recently
developed at the New Jersey Neuropsychiatric Institute. The results of
this test are entered in a two-page report which, after a few hours of
training, any lawyer can understand.
STATUTES AUTHORIZING INCARCERATION
There are two types of process in the law of Ohio through which a
mentally ill person may lose his liberty and become incarcerated in an
institution: civil process, which is embodied in Chapter 5122 of the OHIo
REVISED CODE, and criminal process, which is embodied in Chapter 2945.
There are five forms of civil process, each of which is designed to deal
with a different situation in which the mentally ill patient is found. Section
5122.0225 provides for the patient who wants to be voluntarily admitted
to a hospital, to apply therefore in writing, i.e., "to sign himself in." He
can, as a matter of course, "sign himself out," if he wishes, under the
provisions of section 5122.03,26 unless the hospital staff decides that
they wish to retain him there against his will. Then this section provides
for a 10-day period of time during which the hospital can file an affidavit
in the Probate Court to the effect, "that the patient is mentally ill and the
release of the patient would be unsafe or detrimental for the patient or
others." If the court finds for the hospital, his voluntary status ends, and
he becomes committed. The only way he can avoid this plight is to
cooperate with the hospital until the staff releases him of their own
accord; the statute provides that no judicial proceedings for his commit-
24 T. R. BLAINE, MENTAL HEALTH THROUGH NUTRITION, 141-42 (1969).
25 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.02 (Page 1972).
26 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.03 (Page 1963).
[V/ol. 7:3
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ment can be commenced unless he exercises his option to leave against
the recommendations of the staff. So the patient must play a "guessing
game." Does the staff feel strongly enough about detaining him to file an
affidavit, if he serves notice to them that he wants to leave? Suppose
they "call his bluff?"
Section 5122.062 provides for the hospitalization of a person who
does not object in writing for a period of 90 days, if two licensed
physicians certify that he is "a mentally ill individual subject to
hospitalization by court order," that "because of his illness he is likely
to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty, or is in need of
care or treatment in a mental hospital, and because of his illness lacks
sufficient insight or capacity to make responsible decisions with respect to
his hospitalization." While the "voluntary" statute, 5122.03, provides that
the hospital must provide reasonable means and arrangements for
informing patients of their rights to release, and that it must assist them
in making and presenting such requests, the aforementioned "no-contest"
statute, section 5122.06, provides no such protection; although the patient
can theoretically object to the process, he is not always informed that
he can, in the rush of enthusiastic social workers, doctors, relatives,
friends, or neighbors to get him quickly behind the institutional walls.
When one takes into account the fact that this is a non-judicial form of
incarceration, i.e., that the person is not entitled to a hearing before a
court of law until 90 days of incarceration have passed, a clear issue of
deprivation of due process presents itself. In the case of Bronaugh v.
Harding Hospital, Inc.,28 a doctor was incarcerated through this procedure
in a private mental institution, and the fur was still flying when the court
said in 231 N.E.2d at 492:
A statute such as section 5122.06, Revised Code, providing for the
admission of a person to a hospital without notice to him and
without any judicial process constitutes an invasion of the basic
common-law rights of a citizen and therefore must be strictly
construed ... traditionally our courts have strictly applied the statutes
dealing with the insane (now mentally ill) in such matters as the
giving of notice and otherwise.
The court continued, after citing as precedent the rulings in In re
Koenigshof 29 and State ex rel. Parsons v. Bushong 30
The opening sentence in section 5122.06, Revised Code, says: "Any
individual who does not object in writing may be admitted to a
hospital,..." Such a provision clearly suggests that the individual
must be advised of that right and be afforded the means of making
such a writing, otherwise the provision is totally futile. The
27 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.06 (Page 1972).
28 12 Ohio App. 2d 110, 231 N.E.2d 487 (1967).
29 In re Koenigshoff, 99 Ohio App. 2d 39, 119 N.E.2d 652 (1954).
30State ex rel Parsons v. Bushong, 92 Ohio App. 101, 109 N.E.2d 692 (1945).
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Legislature failed in Section 5102.06, Revised Code, to put the
burden on the head of the hospital to advise a patient of his rights
and to supply writing material, except that it might have done so
by implication.
Dr. Bronaugh claimed in this case that not only was his objection to
hospitalization ignored in violation of statute, but that "the hospital and
the doctor persistently refused him permission to call an attorney, call
doctors of his own choice, or to leave the hospital until August 16, 1962,
on which date he was allowed to leave after 14 days of unlawful
detention." Moreover, one of the two medical certificates did not state the
required criterion for involuntary hospitalization, that the patient would
be likely to injure himself or others if not hospitalized, and the other
noted "suicidal tendencies," but was not written until three days after the
patient was confined! One might note in passing that Dr. Bronaugh was
still very much alive over a year later, when he filed suit against the
hospital for damages for false imprisonment and for three broken ribs
sustained there, and he personally testified in his own behalf when his
case was later tried. Harding Hospital is still widely renowned as one of
the finest private mental institutions in the state, if not the nation. If such
a dreadful denial of a physician's civil rights could occur there, it would
be difficult to adequately assess the possibilities and magnitude of abuse
which could conceivably interfere with the rights of a layman in the
massive and monolithic state hospital system. The need for counsel and
for readily comprehensible information brochures describing the laws
bearing on mental hospitalization, to be available to all patients, becomes
strikingly obvious. Until such an availability is established, liberty and
justice stand continuously in peril.
Sections 5122.08 and 5122.10 provide for emergency hospitalization
procedures when a person is not expected to voluntarily enter the hospital
or to refrain from contesting his incarceration. Under 5122.08,31 he can
be confined up to 60 days if there is a written application to the
hospital stating, "belief that the individual is likely to cause injury to
himself or others if not immediately restrained, and the grounds for such
belief," and a certification by a physician that he has found him to be in
such circumstances. Under section 5122.10,32 no certification by a doctor
is necessary; any health or law enforcement officer can order a person
incarcerated for up to five days if he "has reason to believe that an
individual is mentally ill, and because of his illness, is likely to injure
himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty pending examination and
certification by a licensed physician." Section 5122.1133 is the only one
which provides for the bringing of the patient's plight before a court-
before the hospital gates close on the world behind him. Here an affidavit
31 Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 5122.08 (Page 1972).
32 Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 5122.10 (Page 1972).
33 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.11 (Page 1972).
[Vol. 7:3
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is filed, and the court can either order him immediately locked up for a
reasonable period of time before it schedules a hearing, or it can let him
be at liberty until his hearing.
Regardless of which of the sections a patient is hospitalized under, he
is eventually guaranteed his day in court by section 5,122.15, 34 which
provides for a hearing during which the Probate Court determines his
fitness for hospitalization. He is afforded notice, although it is of
questionable value if he is confined, and he is helpless to do anything but
try to secure legal counsel, if he can afford it. He is not afforded counsel
as a matter of right, as his hearing is considered to be ex parte. The
recent decisions of In re Popp3 5 and In re Fisher,36 in two different Ohio
courts of appeals, tend to question the propriety of this, in fight of the
requirements of due process. Thousands of inmates in the institutions of
Ohio are eagerly yearning for a Supreme Court decision from Columbus
to finally ascertain their right to counsel.
The final procedural defect with regard to competency hearings
involves the fact that most patients who attend such hearings are
under medication at the time the hearing is conducted. This is quite
significant in that much of the medication employed is of the nature
so as to produce a physiological reaction whereby the patient is
functioning at less than normal capacity. As a result, most patients
are in no physiological position to adequately respond to the
substance of the hearing. This factor becomes more crucial and
significant in that, due to the fact that the court officials have no
basic comprehension of the medical data within the report used by
them, the patient's outward appearance and demeanor may often
determine the result of the hearing. This is due to the fact that the
court officials are, in effect, forced to rely significantly on the patient's
outward demeanor. As a result, in numerous hearings, a determina-
tion is made which is significantly based on the patient's demeanor
and response to questions presented. The patient, due to the
medication influence, is destined to portray a less than favorable
impression. The end product, therefore, is a hearing which is destined
to be conducted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.37
If a person's mental illness has so deranged his mind as to result in
the commission of a crime and his apprehension therefor, his society feels
a desperate need to protect itself against further possible depradations by
him; yet also, it is governed at least to some extent by humanitarian
ideals which eschew punishment for offenses where the offender cannot
be held blameworthy, due to his illness. Most such offenders rarely get
34 OHIo R~ay. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (Page 1972).
35 In re Popp, 330 Ohio App. 22, 292 N.E.2d 330 (1972), dismissed on other grounds,
35 Ohio St. 142, 298 N.E.2d 529 (1973).
38 In re Fisher, supra notes 3 and 4.
37 J. Murphy, Study for Administrative Process Course at the University of Akron
Law School (May 6, 1972) at 38 (unpublished paper in Akron Law Review office).
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past the procedure whereby they are found too sick to stand trial, and are
then incarcerated in Lima State Hospital for the Criminally Insane, if
and until such time as they might recover. Section 2945.37 of the
OHIo REVISED CODE states:
If the attorney for a person accused of crime whose cause is pending
in the court of common pleas, before or after trial suggests to the
court that such person is not then sane, and a certificate of a
reputable physician to that effect is presented to the court, or if the
grand jury represents to the court that any such person is not then
sane or if it otherwise comes to the notice of the court that such
person is not then sane, the court shall proceed to examine into
the question of the sanity or insanity of said person, or in its
discretion may impanel a jury for such purpose .... 38
It must be emphasized that this statutory section applies when the
present sanity of the accused is questioned-at this stage of the proceed-
ings, there would not yet have been made a plea of not guilty by reason
of insanity at the time of the commission of the crime. At issue is the
mental fitness of the defendant to stand trial after the criminal act. The
criteria by which such fitness is judged were set forth in the case of State
ex rel Townshend v. Bushong,3 9 later cited in Krauter v. Maxwell.40
The well settled common law rule that a person while insane cannot
be tried, sentenced, or punished for an alleged crime, and that the
only issue presented at a preliminary trial of present insanity is
whether the accused has sufficient soundness of mind to comprehend
his position, to appreciate the charges against him, and the proceed-
ings thereon, and to enable him to make a proper and rational defense.
PENDING LEGAL REFORMS
Perhaps the first substantial work of legal writing on reform of
mental health law in Ohio appeared in the CLEVELAND MARSHALL LAW
REvIEw in 1960.41 Here in a symposium of articles by a number of
forensic psychiatrists, a number of reforms were proposed. Thomas Szacz,
one of the most noteworthy and controversial experts in this field,
proposed that the patient to be examined for purposes of committment
should be informed of the consequences of pathological findings; that he
should be provided with counsel; and that his commitment hearing not be
ex parte in nature, but that he be allowed to defend himself; and that the
State be required to present its findings in support of his incarceration.4
Ewing H. Crawfis suggested that there should be a separation between an
38 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.37 (Page 1953).
39 State ex rel. Townshend v. Bushong, 146 Ohio St. 271, 273, 65 N.E.2d 407, 408
(1946).
40 Krauter v. Maxwell, 3 Ohio St. 2d 142, 209 N.E.2d 571 (1965).
41 Psychiatry and the Law-A Symposium, 9 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 399 (1960).
42 Szacz, Civil Liberties and the Mentally Ill, Id. at 399.
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order for hospitalization and an adjudication of incompetency. 43 For all
intents and purposes both of these occur simultaneously at the present
time, despite the obvious fact that some people are fit subjects for
commitment, while still being adequately lucid for the handling of their
affairs and the transaction of business, such as those who may be
depressed or who are suffering from extreme anxiety. Irvin N. Perr
disclaimed the unnecessary use of restraints, constant observation, and
other restrictions of privacy in hospitals, drawing from his years of experi-
ence in state hospital systems the conclusion that if hospital conditions
were generally as pleasant as possible for the patients, they would rarely
require such drastic measures to keep them from hurting themselves or
others." Henry Davidson suggested three criteria to be used to determine
incompetence in a proceeding separate from the commitment. The patient
would have to have a diagnosable disorder of thinking, this disorder would
have to be impairing his judgment, and this impairment would have to be
such that it leads to squandering, hoarding, or undue gullibility."
In 1961, writing in the Omo STATE LAW JOURNAL, Robert A. Haines
and Webster Myers, Jr.,46 two of the draftsmen of the present mental
health law embodied in Chapter 5122,47 stated that they, too, would
have favored a provision in it establishing separate procedures for
hospitalization and for declaration of incompetency.
Another article appearing in the OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL in
1965,48 written by Thomas Tyack, attacked the Ascherman Act for
disposition of psychopathic offenders, claiming that the term, "psycho-
pathic personality," itself, was no longer considered meaningful in the
field of psychiatry. Nevertheless, he advocated, if this concept was to be
continued as a legal process, the defendant should be afforded counsel, the
right to freedom from self-incrimination, and a separate hearing specially
designed to determine the issue of psychopathy. It should only be
activated after the accused would be convicted. Incarceration should
not be indefinite, but instead the prisoner should be afforded a new
hearing upon the expiration of his sentence. In the event that he should
recover before his sentence had expired, he should be released at that
time. Most important-he should be administered adequate treatment for
his condition, rather than just being "caged-up" like an animal.
Douglas L. Custis, writing in the UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW
43 Crawfis, Civil Rights and Mental Hospital Administration, Id. at 417.
44 Perr, Suicide Responsibility oj Hospital and Psychiatrist, Id. at 427.
45 Davidson, An Appraisal of Competency, Id. at 441.
46 Haines and Myers, Hospitalization and Treatment of the Mentally Ill: Ohio's New
Mental Health Law, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 659-682 (1961).
47 Omo REV. CODE ANN. ch. 5122 (Page 1970).
48 Comment, The Validity of the Segregation of the Sexual Psychopath Under the
Law, 26 Osno ST. LJ. 640 (1965).
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concept of psychopathy is too poorly defined, that any diagnosis would
depend upon the subjectivity of the diagnostician, and that there is a
dearth of practitioners and facilities in Ohio to afford criminal offenders
any substantial degree of treatment for their afflictions.
Perhaps the finest article ever written on the subject of reform of
mental health law in Ohio was published in the CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW
by David N. Strand, a staff attorney of the Cleveland Legal Aid Society,
in December, 1972. 50 In this article, Mr. Strand delves deeply into the
various problems which must be resolved by legal reform, and he presents
a detailed summary of the legislation which his organization helped to
draft and to introduce into the Ohio legislature during the last session.51
This piece of proposed legislation has been revised and re-introduced
during the present session; and as this study goes to print, the House
Judiciary Committee is presently considering the feasibility of its
enactment into law.52
Constituting one of the broadest and most far-reaching reforms of
state mental health legislation in the history of Ohio, and to a certain
extent, the United States as well, House Bill No. MH-984 will attempt
to assure adequate treatment to mentally ill persons, to provide for
the maximum use of least restrictive treatment settings for the
adequate treatment of mental illness, and for the maximum use of
voluntary hospitalization where hospitalization is appropriate, to
provide orderly and reliable procedures consistent with due process
of law for the commitment of persons to hospitals for the mentally
ill in the State of Ohio, and to provide for the protection of the rights
of patients hospitalized pursuant to the laws of the State of Ohio.5
A brief summary of some of the 38 sections of the proposal will be
presented, to acquaint the reader with its salient points.
Section 2111.01 would establish a separate definition for incompe-
tency as an inability to take proper care of one's self or one's property, or
to provide for his family, or for other persons for whom he is charged by
law to provide.5 Section 5122.01 would repeal section 5122.01 (A) of the
OHIo REVISED CODE, pertaining to the definition of a mentally ill
individual; and subsection (B), pertaining to the definition of a person so
sick as to be subject to incarceration,55 would be revised to define such a
person as one who presents a substantial risk of harm to himself or others
49 Ed. Note, Sex Laws in Ohio: A Need for Revision, 35 CIN. L. REv. 211 (1966).
50 Strand, Legal Aid for Patients in State Mental Institutions: The Cleveland Expri-
ence, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REvIEw 483 (1972).
51 H.B. 756, 109th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1971-1972).
52 H.B. 984, 110th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1972-1973).
53 Id. at Title Page.
541d. at 1.
R5 Id. at 3.
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as evidenced by certain manifestations of behavior, or who manifests
certain evidence of being unable to provide for his physical needs, or to
live a socially viable life.56 Although these would be more specific criteria
upon which to base a decision to incarcerate someone in a hospital than
those presently employed, it might be suggested that if a commission of
experts were appointed to establish and regularly update criteria for
diagnosis of presence of mental illness derived from such precise factors
as psychiatric examination, psychological evaluation, and biochemical
testing, such a decision could then be based on far more objective and
concrete grounds. Judging whether there is a substantial risk of the patient
harming himself or others or whether he can care for himself or function
viably in his community would be greatly assisted by having such
information available and considered relevant. It would seem that both
the individual and his society should have the additional protection
afforded by what advanced technology is available; and moreover, the
legal imperatives of due process should demand it.
Section 5122.4051 would establish a Legal Advocacy Service to
provide legal counsel for the mentally afflicted, so as to protect their sights
while involved with the system, and so as to protect them from abuse.
This agency would be headed by a nine-member board of trustees, and
would be completely independent of the state hospital system and the
Attorney-General's office, thereby being able to function without
susceptibility to intra-governmental political pressures.
Section 5122.0258 would amend its predecessor in the existing code
by, among other things, requiring that any patient under 16 years of age
or incompetent who has a parent or guardian apply for voluntary
admission to a hospital on his behalf, be brought to the attention of
the Legal Advocacy Service immediately, so that it can take the necessary
steps to protect his rights.
Section 5122.03, revising further the voluntary admissions procedure
of the present system, would cut down from 10 days to two days the time
during which a hospital can retain a person against his will who was
admitted voluntarily earlier, where he has submitted a request for his
release. Within these two days, the hospital must either file an affidavit
with the court for a hearing or release the patient forthwith.19
Sections 5122.0460 and 5122.04161 relate to the powers and duties
of the State Department of Mental Health and Retardation, the latter of
which would prescribe the establishment of special facilities for handling
5Id. at 3,4.
57 Id. at 48-51.
58 Id. at 7.
59 id. at 8.
60 Id. at 9-10.
61 Id. at 10.
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cases of drug abuse.
Section 5122.05 would allow any patient involuntarily detained or
admitted into the hospital a reasonable number of telephone calls to
obtain counsel and outside medical assistance, and it would afford him
this counsel and independent psychiatric evaluation even if he is indigent.
Moreover, he would be informed by the hospital staff of these rights, and
the Legal Advocacy Service would be informed of his admission, so as to
be able to assist him.62 Such involuntary admission, under the proposed
law, could occur through emergency procedure with medical certificate,
emergency procedure without medical certificate, or judicial procedure.
The "no-contest" procedure for admission under the present section
5122.06,63 where the patient could be admitted for up to 90 days if he
posed no objection, would not be retained. This will eliminate a major
source of abuse, whereby patients may have refrained from objecting to
their incarceration due to fear, pressure from hospital staff or family
members, or simply due to ignorance of their rights. Section 5122.08
would cut down from 60 days to 20 days the period during which a
patient may be retained in the hospital through emergency procedures
based on medical certification. In this case, as in others, the Legal
Advocacy Service would be notified immediately upon admission, and
furnished with copies of the medical certification papers.6 Section
51 2 2.1065 would cut down from five court days to two, the time during
which a patient may be incarcerated through emergency hospitalization
procedure without any medical certification, and would require that in
addition to being a fit subject for hospitalization under the new definition
in section 5122.01, 66 the patient must also present a substantial risk of
causing harm to himself or others. He must be taken into custody as
inconspicuously as possible, to avoid embarrassment and damage to
his reputation.
After the expiration of the periods prescribed in the aforementioned
involuntary committment sections, the incarcerated patient would be
afforded his day in court, in accordance with the new sections 5122.11 to
5122.15. The days of "assembly-line" hearings would be over, and those
"railroad tracks" to the state hospitals would be torn up to comply with
section 5122.051, which does away with the so-called ex-parte hearing,
where the patient is not deemed to be facing an adversary, and thus not
deemed to be in need of counsel to protect any interests. This section
would prescribe that the state hospital system "shall present the case on
behalf of the state at the hearing .... 17 and earlier cited sections
62 Id. at 10-12.
63 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.06 (Page 1970).
64 H.B. 984, 110th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1973-74) at 12-13.
65 Id. at 14-15.
66 id. at 3.
67 Id. at 12.
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would provide for the patient's representation by the Legal Advocacy
Service. If the patient were at large, and if it were desirab!e to hospitalize
him, but there were no emergency need for this, there would be filed in
the Probate Court an affidavit in accordance with section 5122.11, e>
alleging that the patient is a fit subject for hospitalization because his
condition falls under one or more of the specific categories set forth in
section 5,122.01.69 The court may require that this affidavit be supported
by a medical certificate or an affirmation that the patient will not submit
to an examination, and may upon probable cause issue a temporary
detention order allowing his hospitalization, until such time as either
a hearing for probable cause or a hearing for determination of whether
he is a fit subject for involuntary hospitalization is held.
Upon receipt of the affidavit, the court would give written notice to
the patient, his guardian, if any, his spouse, if the address is known, the
affiant, a person designated by the patient or, if he makes no selection, to
an adult next-of-kin other than the affiant, the patient's counsel, the
hospital involved, and to the Legal Advocacy Service, as would be
prescribed in section 5122.12. 70 It is readily observed that these new
provisions for notice would allow for a greater degree of certainty that
the patient's interests will be protected than do the present provisions.
Even if nobody else would speak up for him, at least the patient would
have counsel to protect his rights. Section 5122.13, 71 improving upon the
present procedure, would require the court to have an investigation of
the allegations of the affidavit made by the county welfare department, a
competent social worker, or another investigator whom the court may
appoint. Not only would this investigation be mandatory, but there would
be a full record of the report of the investigation made, thus avoiding a
situation whereby the results could be made orally in chambers to the
judge or his deputy, beyond the scrutiny of the patient or his counsel. The
proposed section 5122.14 would provide for the immediate appointment
of an examining physician after acceptance of the affidavit to certify the
condition of the patient, if it had not been so certified beforehand, either
while he was in the hospital or outside. 72 The court would have the
option of ordering such an examination even if one had already been
conducted. One might suggest further that the proposed section might
provide even more protection for the patient if it were to include
requirements for a routine series of biochemical testing, psychological
evaluation, and psychiatric examination. If the patient were well, this
would be more concrete evidence in his favor; if he were sick, the results
could inform him, his family, his counsel, and the court from the outset
68ld. at 15.
69 Id. at 3.
70Id. at 16-17.
71 Id. at 17-18.
72 d. at 18-19.
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as to what the nature of his illness was and thus what course of treatment
he should look forward to receiving, as a matter of right.
Section 5122.141 of the proposed legislation would provide for
something entirely new to Ohio mental health law-the "hearing to
determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the respondent
is a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order,"7 to be
held whenever possible before the respondent is taken into custody. In any
event, the respondent would have a right to have this hearing within two
court days after his request, or that of his counsel or the Legal Advocacy
Service, once any proceedings have commenced against him, or he has
been admitted or involuntarily detained in the hospital. The hearing would
be conducted in the same manner as the one discussed previously, with
the respondent afforded counsel and an independent psychiatric evalu-
ation, at court expense if he would be indigent. This hearing could be
continued for good cause for a period of not more than three days, upon
request of the respondent, his counsel, or the hospital staff. If the court
finds upon hearing the matter that there is probable cause to believe that
the respondent is a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court
order, it can order an interim order of detention until a final hearing can
be held-within 10 days under section 5122.15; otherwise, the case is
dismissed and all record of the proceedings would be expunged from
the record. Other than raising the ticklish legal question of whether any
court could be empowered to expunge records of its own proceedings,
thus frustrating review by higher courts, this proposed probable cause
hearing does provide for a substantial degree of protection of respondents
who might otherwise be incarcerated when they may not be ill or may
not be so ill as to require it.
The proposed final hearing under section 5122.15 74 would be
conducted after notice was properly given, after the respondent had been
afforded counsel, after the results of the investigation and psychiatric
examination were available, and after a hearing for probable cause, if
any, had occurred. All documents, information, and evidence relating to
the respondent would be made available for his defense, including that
in the possession of the hospital system or other treatment facilities or
practitioners. Respondent would have the right to attend his hearing,
unless unusual circumstances or compelling medical reasons would abjure
this and the respondent, himself, does not wish to attend. He also would
have the right to testify in his behalf, to confront adverse witnesses, to
subpoena other witnesses to testify, and to present and to cross-examine
witnesses. It is presumed that this section, above all others, would provoke
the most vehement opposition of the entrenched bureaucracy of fossilized
Freudians who run the state hospital system. For the first time, their
73 Id. at 19.
74 Id. at 21-30.
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modus operandi for the diagnosis of mental illness and for the develop-
ment of a rationale for incarcerating their prey will be exposed to the full
scrutiny of the patient, his family, and counsel, for the record, and will be
readily assailable in all of its weaknesses. Great benefit to the public
should inure, however, as incarcerations upon inadequate grounds and
faulty diagnoses would be avoided, and the level of psychiatric practice
in the state hospital system would rise to the high degree presently
observed in other fields of medicine. Section 5122.15 also would provide
for all other rights for the respondent enjoyed by defendants in other
adversary procedures, and for the court's safeguarding those rights by
diligent inquiry as to whether they were being implemented, to include
the continuous process of advising the respondent of these rights as each
step in the commitment procedure was arrived at. Upon completion of
the hearing, the court must either find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
respondent is fit subject for hospitalization, or dismiss the case and order
him released forthwith. If the former finding is reached, the court may
order him for a period not exceeding 90 days to a hospital, clinic, or to
a practitioner for a program of treatment least restrictive in nature of his
liberty, consistent with the needs of the program. If more treatment is
still needed at the end of 90 days, another hearing must be held.
Subsequent periods of commitment not to exceed 90 days may be ordered
without a hearing, if none is requested, but a hearing must be held at least
every two years thereafter, to avoid situations like that in which one
Miss Martha Nelson was discovered to have been incarcerated in
Orient State Hospital for 98 years.
It would appear that section 5122.15 would offer a high degree of
protection of the patient's right to treatment, as well as of his right
to be retained in a hospital or other program only if he needs it. With
utilization of new biochemical technology of therapy, the first few months
are very critical-it is during this period that the patient must be
diagnosed as to the precise imbalances in his body chemistry and
metabolic systems, and an attempt must be made to bring these back into
balance. During this period, frequent hearings will enable the court, the
patient's counsel, and the medical staff of the hospital as well, to observe
how well he is coming along. Any problems in the progress of his
treatment or in his adjustment to his new environment which would
call for legal resolutions could then be ironed out. Also, the availability
of precise, concrete, biochemical test results, to supplement the
psychological evaluation and psychiatric examinations administered to
the patient, will enable the jury, if one is requested by a patient for
his hearing as is provided for in this section, to more readily reach a
conclusion, despite their being laymen and having no prior exposure to
the mental health field. They would not have to rely solely on confusing
and variegated testimony of an empirical nature by the psychiatrists and
psychologists. This would be most important, in a case where three-fourths
of an eight-man jury must concur to continue commitment.
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Section 5122.29 of the proposed legislation, covering patients' rights,
would thrust directly into the issue of the right to treatment.75 Section
5122.27, mentioned earlier in this study, already had placed on the books
the requirement that patients be afforded treatment "in accordance
with the highest standards of medical practice." 76 One would think that
this unmistakably clear criterion, when combined with the also earlier
mentioned state constitutional provision and subsequent court interpreta-
tions thereof, would have resulted in a diligent effort by the state hospital
system to deliver what it was supposed to deliver in the way of mental
health care. The recent findings of the Citizens Task Force on Mental
Health and Retardation, which submitted its report on October 4, 1972.
indicated the contrary to be true, however:
The Department provides little more than the most primitive form of
custodial, institutional care for the 19,000 patients and inmates
in Ohio's mental health and mental retardation and psychiatric
criminology institutions. There has never been sufficient personnel toprovide programs of rehabilitation and resocialization, so that
patients can be returned to their communities. Direct care represents
the weakest link in the chain of services. 7
As for the caliber of the doctors entrusted with the patients' therapy, the
task force reported: "almost half the number of physicians employed are
in danger of dismissal by the State Medical Board because they do not
meet necessary qualifications." 7 8 The tragic irony of it all is, that within
the confines of the present budget, there are adequate numbers of qualified
personnel and ample modalities of therapy to adequately care for Ohio's
mentally ill, within the "availability" limitations of section 5122.27, if
biochemical technology were used.
The proposed section 5122.2979 would strike at the heart of these
heinous abuses, requiring written treatment plans, which would be
available to the patient, his family, and his counsel, for their review, and
which would set forth diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment goals to be
pursued. Moreover, the proposal would prescribe prompt and adequate
treatment for any physical ailments contracted, and provision for the
patients to have a certain degree of privacy, to wear personal clothing of
their own, to maintain possession of personal belongings, to be afforded
storage space for them, and to have uncensored access to reading
materials. They would be entitled to receive visitors, including their
counsel and personal physician, and to engage in unopened written
75 Id. at 37-45.
76 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.27 (Page 1970).
77 Citizens' Task Force on Mental Health and Mental Retardation, Findings andRecommendations: Design for a Coordinated System of Services to the Mentally Ill
and Mentally Retarded in Ohio, pt. V, at p. 63 (1972).
78 Id. at 90.
79 H.B. 984, 110th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1973-74) at 37-45.
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correspondence and confidential telephone conversations. Moreover, they
would be entitled to have these basic modes of human dignity financially
provided for by the state if they are too indigent to afford them. They
would be entitled to engage in "interaction" (whatever that means) with
members of the same sex or opposite sexes under adequate supervision.
The patient would have the right to refuse brain or psycho-surgery, shock
treatments, aversion therapy, and other dangerous modalities, and he
would have the right to receive current information on his treatment
program and as to expectations of progress in terms he can understand. He
would have a right to refuse excessive medication-the "chemical
straightjacket." It might be assumed that if the patient, his family, and
counsel have the right to access to his treatment plans formulated by the
hospital, they will readily observe any deficiencies therein and take steps
against the hospital staff to have them corrected. In the light of the recent
discoveries in the field of orthomolecular psychiatry, and the availability
of treatment modalities derived therefrom, and in the light of the poor
quality of medical personnel revealed in the Citizens Task Force Report,
it may often be necessary for strong measures to be taken to upgrade the
patient's treatment plan. To accomplish this, both he, his family, and his
counsel will have to educate themselves in the basics of better alternate
modalities of therapy, so as to challenge the judgment of his physicians
before the courts. And the courts are going to face the necessity of delving
into medical, psychiatric and biochemical matters in order to assure the
patient of the highest standards in treatment. In the words of the court
which decided the case of National Investment Company v. Kohn: "The
time must never come when, because of frustration with concepts foreign
to their legal training, courts abdicate their judicial responsibility to protect
the.., rights of individual citizens."80 Much as the new psychochemical
discoveries discussed earlier in this study may boggle the mind of
the judiciary, judges must learn to enforce implementation of them by the
state hospital system when patients aggrieved by malpractice come before
them; otherwise, all of the procedural protection contained in the new
legislative proposal will be enacted in vain. A patient can be incarcerated
in a hospital in such a manner that all conceivable procedural rights
which could be afforded him are protected; yet, if he doesn't have the
most technologically advanced therapeutic modalities applied to treat
his affliction, he will be deprived of the most important right he could
possibly have-the right to get well. Readers of the new proposal.
particularly legislators who will be faced with the decision of whether
to enact it and judges who will be entrusted with the duty to enforce it,
would do well to recall the words of the draftsmen of the presently existing
mental health legislation, spoken in 1961 at the time of its enactment:
But it is not the final answer. The modem perspective of
80National Land and Invest. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 522, 215 A.2d 597, 607
(1965).
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hospitalization and treatment of the mentally ill is in its infancy.
Psychiatric care techniques may be discovered in this decade which
will completely antiquate Ohio's new effort. Those in the mental
health program must be cautious against complacency. Change must
be prompt and welcomed. An obstructive law in this field is less
tolerable than in another field, because a lack of the best treatment
available adds to the tragic misery and despair of those afflicted
with mental illness.8'
Slightly more than a decade after these remarkably prophetic words
were written, Dr. David Hawkins, director of the North Nassau Mental
Health Center in Manhasset, Long Island, wrote
Before the adoption of orthomolecular methods, schizophrenic
patients were seen three times per week, 48 weeks per year, for
a total of 144 visits per year. Additional visits with family and
emergency visits brought the average close to 150 visits per year.
With the use of orthomolecular methods, schizophrenic patients are
now seen, on the average, 15 visits per year---one-tenth the former
number. With an annual budget of $300,000, the Clinic's cost per
patient per year in 1971 was only $200, including diagnostic
laboratory work.82
Will Ohio's legislature, mental health system, bench, and bar be capable
of appreciating the significance of such findings and of working together
to implement them in a state-wide effort to reduce spiraling mental health
care costs and bring speedier relief to her mentally afflicted?
In the event that the patient can have his illness brought under
control, the sweeping civil rights provisions of the proposed section
5122.29 would afford him a degree of protection sorely needed if he is
to pick up the pieces of his shattered life in the outside world. He could
not be denied employment or licenses to practice his occupation solely by
reason of his having been treated for mental illness. Nor could any record
of his treatment therefore be released to any party without his permission.
Even while hospitalized, he could not be denied such processes as the
right to sue, to make a will, to marry, or to seek a divorce, unless he were
to be adjudicated incompetent in a separate hearing. In compliance with
the urgings of legal reformers cited earlier in this chapter, and others,
incompetency would no longer be inferred from the fact of involuntary
hospitalization. In a further reform, this section would greatly restrict
the hospital's arbitrarily confining the patient in straightjackets, other
restraints, or in solitary confinement.
The proposed section 5122.17 would also severely restrict the
confinement of mentally ill persons in jails or other penal institutions,
presumably except for short emergency periods until they could be
81 Supra note 46, at 682.
82D. Hawkins, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTEGRATED COMMUNITY SYSTEM FOR THE
EFFECTIVE TREATMENT OF SCHIZOPHRENIA 8 (1972).
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transferred to appropriate facilities for their care.8 In the event that it
would become necessary to transfer a patient from one treatment facility
to another, section 5122.20 would provide for the notification of his
family or guardian, his counsel, or the Legal Advocacy Service.84 Before
effectuating any such transfer, due consideration would have to be given
to the convenience of the new location for visits from his family, friends,
counsel, and other interested parties. The patient would also be given the
right to object to his transfer on such grounds, and to have a hearing on
the merits thereof. Ninety-day limits are placed on trial visits by section
5122.22.85 Presumably, at the end of this period the hospital staff would
have to make up their minds as to whether they want to give their charge
a full release or terminate the visit, thus avoiding some of the virtually
interminable trial visits which some patients are limited to, rather than
being given their full liberty. In the event that an escaped patient is
apprehended, proposed section 5122.26 would provide for the Legal
Advocacy Service to be notified immediately, so as to be able to provide
legal counsel during this trying period for both the patient and the hospital
to which he is returned.86 Where a patient would be subjected to an
illegal involuntary hospitalization, or another deprivation of rights, section
5122.34 would award him with a cause of action against the State of
Ohio.Y In view of the recent episode at the Lima State Institution for the
Criminally Insane, where a grand jury investigating charges of brutality
found barbarous cruelties being inflicted on patients which best resembled
the infamous Marquis de Sade epic of eighteenth century France, and
indicted over 30 asylum guards,88 it might be advisable to enact into law
both stiff criminal and civil sanctions which might be available to deter
and, if necessary, to prosecute future depradations by such nefarious
predators. To clear up the confusion over the question of whether doctors
would be liable to malpractice suits if their malfeasance were done while
in the scope of state employment, legislation subjecting them to sanctions
as well should be enacted. Only such drastic means would assure patients
and their families that Ohio has indeed entered a new era insofar as
protection of the mentally ill from abuse is concerned.
CONCLUSION
It could be properly argued that there are relatively few cases
whereby persons are incarcerated in mental institutions who are not
actually sick enough to be there, or offenders sentenced to prison who
should be hospitalized, and that the addition of more procedural
83H.B. 984, 110th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1972-1973) at 31.
84 Id. at 32-33.
85 Id. at 34-35.
86 Id. at 37.
87 Id. at 47.
8Widman, New Rules Seek Curb on Lima State Abuses, Cleveland Plain Dealer,
June 30, 1973, at 6-C.
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safeguards in these areas would be prohibitively costly in relation to the
number of cases of injuries which would be prevented. It is the age-old
balance every society has had to weigh between the values of expediency
versus justice. But, is this the only issue involved? If all persons brought
before the courts for consideration of a mental problem were to be
administered through psychiatric examinations, psychological evaluations,
and biochemical testing, these results would be available to point the way
to treatment appropriate to the diagnosed cause of their disorder. If this
proper treatment would be administered for all patients, it is probable that
many, if not most, would recover enough to regain their liberty and save
the people of the State of Ohio millions of dollars in future years, which
would greatly outweigh the costs of the legal safeguards proposed herein.
Over and above the cost factor, however, there exists the question of
humanitarianism. How can the degree of civilization of a society be better
judged than on how well it takes care of its afflicted brethren?
At its beginning, this study recounted the tale of John Brown. It
would end with the saga of another man, whose name must remain
buried in the archaeological past, but whose community possessed a set
of standards for care of their infirm which the people of Ohio might
well be challenged to emulate:
Forty thousand years ago in the bleak uplands of southwestern Asia,
a man, a Neanderthal man, once labeled by the Darwinian proponents
of struggle as a ferocious ancestral beast-a man whose face might
cause you some slight uneasiness if he sat beside you-a man of this
sort existed with a fearful body handicap in that ice-age world. He
had lost an arm, but still he lived and was cared for. Somebody, some
group of human beings, in a hard, violent, and stony world, loved
this maimed creature enough to cherish him.89
JAMES K. FELDMAN
89 Osmond, The Medical Model in Psychiatry, 21 Hospital and Community Psychia-
try 7 (Sept. 1970), citing L. EsELY, FIRMAMENT OF TIME (1960).
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